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THE PRICE OF PLEASURE: CHILDREN HURT TOO
Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend*
I. INTRODUCTION
Shari Motro, in her articles entitled The Price of Pleasure and Preglimony, 1
asks us to reconceptualize conception. She proposes, at least idyllically, 2
substantial reforms to the laws on male responsibilities to females for harms
caused by human conception via consensual sex. 3 Her goal is to minimize the
“fundamental gender imbalance.”4 A man who engages in sex leading to
conception is currently not legally obligated to compensate his female partner for
harms associated with pregnancy, including psychological injuries, lost wages,
maternity clothes, or childbirth classes. 5 The status quo resembles an unfair “onesize-fits7-all” 6 approach, Motro says, and requires the woman to shoulder all the
burdens of accidental pregnancy 7 in the absence of a marital relationship.8 The
current legal default regime treats “lovers as strangers” and pregnancy as a
woman’s problem. 9 Motro argues for a new paradigm that holds men responsible
for the burdens of pregnancy of their unmarried lovers. 10

* © 2012 Jeffrey A. Parness is a Professor Emeritus at Northern Illinois University
College of Law and Zachary Townsend is an associate attorney at Crosby & Associates,
Rockford, Illinois.
1
See generally Shari Motro, The Price of Pleasure, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 917 (2010)
[hereinafter The Price of Pleasure]; Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REV. 647 (2011)
[hereinafter Preglimony].
2
Preglimony, supra note 1, at 650 (characterizing her own proposals as “utopian”).
3
The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 956 (“Again, this Article is concerned with
pregnancies that result from sex that is consensual and involves no fraud or deceit.”). At
times, even with fraud or deceit, similar responsibilities remain. Id. at 945 n.117 (child
support for the biological parents operate “without reference to . . . fault”).
4
Id.at 918, 921.
5
Id. at 929–31.
6
Preglimony, supra note 1, at 662.
7
The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 918 (“[S]ome have little sympathy for the
accidentally pregnant”).
8
Preglimony, supra note 1, at 656.
9
The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 921, 976.
10
Motro proposes two approaches to damages. Pregnancy-related obligations may be
based on 1) a standard founded on actual costs of pregnancy adjusted for common variables
such as length of pregnancy and the age of the woman; or 2) the individual costs of each
pregnancy. Courts might calculate the costs of pregnancy under the latter approach in
various manners, including an equal division of costs, a division of costs based on
differences in wealth, or cost divisions on a case-by-case approach. Id. at 963–64. See also
Preglimony, supra note 1, at 667 (sex prompting conception creates a “special relationship
that demands its own category”).
245
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For Motro, marriage is an inadequate cure to the current legal presumption
disfavoring pregnant women. 11 She opines that marriage does not effectively
“regulate the vulnerabilities that come along with reproduction” 12 and fails “as
society’s main mechanism for safeguarding the interests of the accidentally
pregnant . . . .” 13 Motro proposes “something that falls in between that of complete
strangers and that of spouses, unless they agree otherwise.” 14 Sexually active
couples would be free to opt-out, 15 because “casual lovers . . . should be permitted
to set their own rules.” 16 Couples desiring “a no-strings-attached encounter,” that is
“those who expect to have no responsibilities vis-à-vis each other should
pregnancy occur,” would be free from obligations. 17
Motro supports a novel legal status for lovers who do not expressly opt-out,
finding that theories like unjust enrichment 18 or an equity-based approach 19 sustain
pregnancy-support claims. According to her, sex implies a promise 20—“an
agreement to assume mutual obligations of support [where] communication can be
inferred.” 21 Motro supports the enforcement of such an unspoken pact in the
event of breach, “when the promise is broken and pregnancy support is not
forthcoming . . . .” 22
Motro draws from tort and contract principles used by those involved in
“controlled sadomasochism,” 23 focusing on the prevalence of liability waivers. 24
11

Preglimony, supra note 1, at 660 (“A pregnant woman married to the man with
whom she conceives is thus marginally safer than a pregnant woman who is unwed”).
12
The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 952.
13
Id. at 953. See also id. at 956 (“Since marriage does not always link intercourse,
procreation, and responsibility, and since it does not always fill the void by binding a man
to the woman with whom he conceived, the blinkered reliance on marriage to solve the
problem is misplaced.”).
14
Id. at 940.
15
Id. at 950 (law should “plac[e] the burden to opt-out on that those who prefer a nostrings-attached rule”).
16
Preglimony, supra note 1, at 657.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 670.
19
The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 956.
20
Preglimony, supra note 1, at 669 (“Sex implies a baseline level of responsibility—a
promise.”).
21
The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 957.
22
Preglimony, supra note 1, at 670. Motro references tenets of contract law
throughout The Price of Pleasure, proposing a new legal status in which “partners who
conceive [are] recognized under the rubric of a distinct legal relationship . . . .” Supra note
1, at 957. However, whether Motro intends to ground her proposal in contract law or tort
law is unclear. Motro explains in detail that sex creates an enforceable agreement, but then
states that “[t]he implicit assumption at work is that absent the agreement, parties would be
responsible toward each other.” Id. at 950.
23
The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1 at 921, 949. Motro’s focuses on
“[s]adomasochism as a [m]irror” on agreements to waive liability for acts that would
otherwise constitute intentional torts. Id. at 949–51.
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She suggests that contracts regarding sadomasochism can inform a new approach
to the law of conception because such contracts similarly recognize “that intimacy
involving inherently unequal risks demands explicit discussion regarding the
allocation of potential consequences.”25
Motro uses sadomasochism to illustrate that contract law can (and does) apply
to many sexual relationships. 26 She suggests that risks of malfunctioning
sadomasochism equipment can “mirror” other risks of sexual behavior, including
pregnancy. 27 Motro explains that individuals who engage in sadomasochism often
sign agreements indicating that the involved parties will be free from liability in
the event that devices fail or that there is a mistake or accident. 28
Motro argues that the use of contract law can similarly apply in certain sexual
encounter settings outside of sadomasochism, including where an unmarried man
and an unmarried woman conceive a child when the two previously agree that the
man will be wholly or partly liable for the costs of the woman’s pregnancy, and
where an unmarried man and an unmarried woman conceive a child but the couple
has not previously discussed who is liable for the costs of the woman’s
pregnancy. 29
Unfortunately, Motro does not explore the implications of her proposal
beyond these scenarios. 30 Would conception trigger pregnancy-support obligations
when one sexual partner is married and one sexual partner is unmarried?31 Does it
matter if the unmarried partner is male or female? And what if both partners are
married to others? If a marriage or dissolution of marriage occurs after conception
but prior to birth how should pregnancy-support obligations then operate? 32
Motro’s proposal is limited not only by her identification of the couples
involved, but also by her limited focus on the ensuing harms. Motro focuses on
24

Id. at 949–50.
Id. at 950.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 949–51.
28
Id. at 951.
29
Id. at 937–39.
30
Id. at 951 (recognizing that her proposal is imperfect). But Motro identifies other
imperfections, such as the difficulty in valuating the burdens women endure during
pregnancy and whether positive benefits bestowed on women during pregnancy (including
“unparalleled opportunities for personal growth, healing and joy”) should offset the pains
of pregnancy. Id. at 929, 963.
31
See, e.g., GDK v. Dep’t of Family Services, 2004 WY 78, ¶ 4, 92 P.3d 834, 835
(Wyo. 2004) (“TAK, mother of the children in question, was married to GDK, appellant
herein, at the time her children, DDK and MK, were born; however, she had a relationship
with JMW and was living with him at the time of both births. Genetic testing established
that JMW was the biological father of the children.”).
32
See, e.g., In re State, Div. of Child Support Enforcement, ex rel. NDB, 2001 WY
118, ¶¶ 3–9, 35 P.3d 1224 (Wyo. 2001) (appellant impregnated mother who subsequently
married appellee during her second trimester); Nebraska ex rel. Clanton v. Clanton, 1996
WL 456037, at *1 (Neb. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 1996) (divorce preceded birth).
25
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pregnancies leading to abortion, miscarriage, or birth. 33 She does not discuss
whether lovers should be liable for other harms stemming from sex, including
sexually transmitted diseases.34 Should the law comparably treat “lovers as
strangers” in pregnancy and infectious disease settings? 35
Most curious for us is Motro’s utter failure to discuss the children in the birth
setting. 36 Her (utopian) proposals attempt to separate horizontal relationships
(between sexual partners) from vertical relationships (between children and

33

The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 921.
Id. at 918 n.7 (suggesting that infectious diseases may similarly “tend to harm
women more than they harm men”). Motro does not indicate where or whether sexually
transmitted infections fit within her proposal. Id.
35
See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681 (N.Y. Just. 1993) (“[P]ersons who
engage in unprotected sex, at a time of the prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases,
including some that are fatal, assume the risk of contracting such diseases. Both parties in
an intimate relationship have a duty to adequately protect themselves. When one ventures
out in the rain without an umbrella, should they complain when they get wet?”). But cf.
Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 234 (La. 1994) (“the duty of [an] infected party, who
knows, should know, or should suspect that he or she is infected with a sexually
transmitted disease is either to abstain from sexual contact with others or, at least, to warn
others of the infection prior to having contact with them”).
36
Children are not much discussed by Motro, however a footnote acknowledges that
an attempt to disentangle the benefits of pregnancy support from the benefits of child
support can yield “arbitrary” results. The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 966 n.198. Yet
Motro evidently believes that as with mother and child well-being, expectant mother and
potential child well-being can also be separated. Id. We believe this is at best a herculean
task prior to birth.
Our concerns are not limited to the unrecognized interests of children (and potential
human life). For example, while we agree with Motro that “a default that gives no
consideration whatsoever to nonviolent men’s interest in knowing about a pregnancy goes
too far,” we think she does not go far enough with her suggestion that women need notify
such men of their pregnancies only after the men have registered publicly as putative
fathers following intercourse. Id. at 958–59. Elsewhere, Professor Parness has urged that
governments require mothers to inform unwed nonviolent fathers of their (actual or
possible) children when the mothers seek adoption placement or safe haven refuge (as here
there can be strings attached—including waivers of (possible) privacy interests). See
Jeffrey A. Parness, Systematically Screwing Dads: Out of Control Paternity Schemes, 54
WAYNE L. REV. 641, 670–71 (2008).
34

2012]

THE PRICE OF PLEASURE

249

parents). 37 We suggest a different approach when there are children, accepting
Motro’s invitation for conversation. 38
II. THE MALE LOVER’S INEXTRICABLY LINKED DUTIES TO MOTHER,
FUTURE OFFSPRING, AND CHILD
Support payments awarded to a pregnant woman can help both the woman
and potential child. 39 Support awards will often be influenced by the cost of
necessities that are jointly consumed by mother and potential child, the proportions
of which are indeterminable. 40 Effectively, support does not always flow directly
and exclusively to the designated beneficiaries. 41 Like Motro says, human beings
are “inescapably interdependent.” 42 “Hidden child support” can appear in present
and former partner maintenance awards just like “hidden alimony” can appear in
child support awards. 43 Common sense suggests that maintenance and pregnancy
37

Until and unless a child is born, Motro argues that “a man’s economic
responsibility should be conceptualized as a responsibility toward the woman herself.” The
Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 919. See also id. at 930–31 (criticizing existing laws for
framing pregnancy “obligations as an element of a man’s child support obligations or as
part of a parentage order, not as a duty toward[] the woman in her own right”); Preglimony,
supra note 1, at 669 (analogizing a man’s obligation toward his pregnant lover “to the
support obligations of a breadwinner toward a dependent spouse”).
38
The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 919 (“The goal of this Article is to start a
conversation . . . virtually no one has focused on the legal relationship between unmarried
sexual partners who conceive”). See also id. at 958 (hoping to start a conversation within
the range of possible parameters she sets out); Preglimony, supra note 1, at 649 (“Current
scholarship on the legal relationship between unmarried lovers who conceive is virtually
nonexistent, judicial commentary on the scope of unwed fathers’ pregnancy-related
obligations is sparse, and many state courts have been silent. Uncertainty abounds, leaving
unmarried lovers who conceive to muddle through on their own. . . . Today, with over onethird of births and two-thirds of abortions occurring outside of marriage, the status is quite
untenable.”). Incidentally, as demonstrated by later references, we find some scholarship
(including our own), as well as some helpful state judicial and legislative actions.
39
See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, A Case Study in Failed Law Reform: Arizona’s Child
Support Guidelines, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 137, 145 (2012) (policy choices about child support
are “further complicated by the fact that minor children do not live alone, and that members
of their household necessarily sharing a living standard. So the cost of providing the child a
safe place to live . . . necessarily includes the cost of providing that home to the custodial
parent, and perhaps to others in the child’s household as well.”).
40
See, e.g., Ira M. Ellman & Sanford L. Braver, Lay Intuitions About Child Support
and Marital Status, 23 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 465, 466 (2011) (“the law may distinguish
transfers of income between households by their label—‘alimony’ or ‘child support’—but
the reality of household economics makes those labels largely meaningless.”).
41
The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 931 (“a child’s prebirth health cannot be
disentangled from the health of his or her expectant mother”).
42
Preglimony, supra note 1, at 658–59.
43
Ellman & Braver, supra note 40, at 466–67 (“Quite obviously, neither the effort to
resist ‘hidden alimony’ in child support nor the implicit recognition of ‘hidden child
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support are largely shared in parent-child households. 44 A male lover’s duties to a
female partner as well as to present and future offspring are inextricably linked, 45
making conversations about the price of pleasure impossible without discussions
of future offspring and children. 46
We suggest expanded obligations and opportunities for prospective fathers
that would serve the betterment of potential human life, children and women.
Children and mothers would benefit from expanded obligations of male support
prior to birth, 47 addressed in Part III. In Part IV, we address the benefits created by
enhanced opportunities for voluntary paternity acknowledgements of children not
yet born. Finally, in Part V, we explore the imprecise parameters of the “unitary
family” concept, concluding that American states might obligate a man (and
another woman) to support a woman as well as her future offspring and child born
of sex,48 sometimes even if there was no sex between them. Here we favor
statutory laws that create contractual-type duties.

support’ in alimony resolves the tension between the economic realities of household
finances and the legal fiction that alimony and child support dollars affect only the
obligor’s former spouse of the obligor’s child, respectively, but never both.”).
44
See, e.g., id. at 18, 35–36 (alimony experiments, involving the survey of 356
individuals selected randomly from the Pima County (Tucson, Arizona) jury panel, found
that respondents are “more likely to award alimony to a former partner who has primary
custody of the couple’s minor children, even though that parent is already collecting child
support.”).
45
Similarly, at times claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and privacy
violations cannot be separated from claims of sexual harassment. See, e.g., Maksimovic v.
Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 21–22 (Ill. 1997) (common law tort claim “inextricably linked” to
claim of sexual harassment must be litigated together in the Illinois Human Rights
Commission which had, at the time, exclusive jurisdiction over the harassment claim).
46
See The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 977 (stating “the true price of pleasure”
involves a pregnancy resulting from consensual sex where neither of the partners “want
children” or, more appropriately, where neither partner wishes pregnancy). Motro wishes
more couples to discover their “true desires” through conversations, envisioning that such
conversations only involve the relationships between the men and women themselves. See
id.
47
Prebirth conduct by an unwed potential father toward a pregnant woman needing
support directly impacts upon the welfare of any future child as well as any future mother.
See, e.g., In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 746 (Fla. 1989). See also Jeffrey A.
Parness, Pregnant Dads: The Crimes and Other Misconduct of Expectant Fathers, 72 OR.
L. REV. 901, 916 (1993) [hereinafter Pregnant Dads].
48
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129–30 (1989).
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III. ENHANCED MALE PARENTAL AND QUASI-PARENTAL OBLIGATIONS
PRIOR TO BIRTH
The law often treats expectant fathers as strangers to expectant mothers.49
Similarly, expectant fathers are often treated as strangers to their potential
offspring. 50 Reforms creating legal duties of expectant fathers to expectant
mothers, as in Motro’s proposal, should necessarily include discussions of duties
that these same expectant fathers owe their potential offspring. Unfortunately,
Motro concludes: “Child support obligations should kick in only once a child is
born; until and unless this happens, a man’s economic responsibility should be
conceptualized as a responsibility towards the woman herself.”51
The fact that a man is not yet a parent of a fetus should not relieve him of
parental or quasi-parental support responsibilities. As the Florida Supreme Court
said, a “father’s argument that he has no parental responsibility prior to birth . . . is
legally, morally, and socially indefensible.” 52 Beyond support, special statutes
should also address physical harm that expectant fathers inflict upon their
unborn. 53 An expectant father who assaults his pregnant lover, for instance, should
face possible prosecutions distinct from the assault against the mother and distinct
from other third party liability for fetal injury. 54 Current crimes such as supplying
illegal drugs to an expectant woman should also carry enhanced penalties when
potential human life is knowingly endangered by expectant fathers. 55
Laws outside the child support and criminal law context should also hold
expectant fathers accountable for their harmful pre-birth conduct. The Supreme
Court of Florida, for example, held that a father who abandons his potential
offspring terminates his right to participate in any later adoption proceeding. 56 The
49

The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 921 (for unwed sexual partners, as “modern
American jurisprudence views human beings as essentially separate individuals whose
primary value is privacy . . . . The law privileges autonomy and privacy . . . [and not]
relationship and mutual responsibility . . . . [T]he law treats lovers as strangers.”).
50
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (noting that for unwed sexual partners
who conceive, the mother is always a legal parent at birth while the father can only become
a parent under law by developing custodial, emotional or financial ties).
51
The Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 919. But see id. at 931 (“child support
begins in utero”).
52
In re Doe, 543 So.2d at 746 (further stating that such an argument “is not a norm
that society is prepared to recognize”).
53
Pregnant Dads, supra note 47, at 914–15.
54
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought”). An exception is made, however, for the
expectant mother. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(b)(3) (when “mother of fetus” is involved,
there can be no murder of the fetus). See also Fetal Homicide Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES, (updated April 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/fetalhomicide-state-laws.aspx (at least 38 states have fetal homicide laws).
55
Pregnant Dads, supra note 47, at 915.
56
In re Doe, 543 So. 2d at 749 (“We hold that the failure of respondent natural father
to provide prebirth assistance to the pregnant mother, when he was able and assistance was
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court found abandonment could be based on the future father’s failure to pay
“monies toward prenatal medical bills, food, or medications” 57 or otherwise to
provide “meaningful, repetitive and customary support”58 to the mother prior to
birth. Male failure to provide pre-birth support should also be considered in other
post-birth settings, such as marriage dissolution and male-initiated paternity
actions. The use of domestic violence fetal protection orders to deter injurious
conduct by lovers is yet another alternative. 59 Lastly, there should be some, though
limited, tort claims available to children against their fathers for birth disabilities
arising from harmful pre-birth conduct.
Legal obligations of expectant fathers to their unborn children (both monetary
and nonmonetary) are necessarily tied to the well-being of their pregnant
counterparts. Parental or quasi-parental responsibilities of men prior to birth serve
the betterment of expectant mothers and also embody “the price of pleasure.” 60
Conversations about pregnancy-related duties of a man as lover should not be
separated from conversations about pregnancy-related duties of a man as potential
father.
IV. PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS PRIOR TO BIRTH
There can be pre-birth paternity rights as well as obligations. Paternity laws
allow recognition of fatherhood at the time of birth. This recognition benefits the
mother-father relationship as well as the father-child relationship. 61 Pre-birth
voluntary paternity acknowledgments, available to expectant fathers, would

needed, vested respondent natural mother with the sole parental authority to consent to the
adoption of the child and removed from the natural father the privilege of vetoing the
adoption by refusing to give consent.”).
57
Id. at 747 n.3 (adopting the court findings from In re Adoption of Doe, 524 So. 2d
1037, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
58
Id.
59
See, e.g., Gloria C. v. William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984)
(permitting a pregnant woman, who had been assaulted earlier by her husband, to obtain an
order of protection on behalf of her four month old fetus).
60
See generally Ellman, supra note 39. Such responsibilities sometimes only
significantly affect the well-being of the child. For instance, a posthumous child may be
entitled to the social security benefits of a deceased father upon proving (1) that the child’s
father was an insured individual and (2) that “such insured individual was living with or
contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such insured individual died.” See 42
U.S.C. § 416; see also Parsons for Bryant v. Health & Human Services, 762 F.2d 1188,
1190 (4th Cir. 1985) (posthumous child was entitled to social security benefits of deceased
father because of quasi-parental support existed at the time of the father’s death).
61
Paternity recognition at birth need not involve a mother-father relationship. See,
e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Arming the Pregnancy Police: More Outlandish Concoctions, 53
LA. L. REV. 427, 445–47 (1992) (discussing the legal duties of prospective fathers,
concluding that these are important to resolving questions of termination of rights and
enforcing financial or other responsibilities prior to birth).
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similarly benefit both the expectant mother and forthcoming child. 62 Every state is
already obligated (as a condition to the receipt of federal funds) 63 to provide most
unwed fathers with an opportunity to acknowledge paternity at birth. 64
Considerable interstate disparities now exist, however, regarding pre-birth
acknowledgements. 65 For example, South Carolina 66 and Texas 67 permit voluntary
pre-birth paternity acknowledgments, while Colorado 68 and New York 69 explicitly
62

See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7570 (a) (West 2004), which states:

There is a compelling state interest in establishing paternity for all children.
Establishing paternity is the first step toward a child support award, which, in
turn, provides children with equal rights and access to benefits, including . . .
social security, health insurance . . . and inheritance rights. Knowledge of
family medical history is often necessary for correct medical diagnosis and
treatment. Additionally, knowing one’s father is important to a child’s
development.
See also, e.g., In re Perez, 330 N.Y.S.2d 881, 886 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1972) (“By its very
nature, wrongful death operates as a link to paternity only when the putative father during
his lifetime is proved to have supported the child; without this no damage can be suffered
in the wrongful death.”); Pregnant Dads, supra note 47, at 916 (allowing expectant
mothers to bring paternity actions so that expectant fathers can be compelled to provide
financial support for their unborn would serve the betterment of both the child-to-be and
the mother-to-be); Ellman and Braver, supra note 40, at 466.
63
Voluntary state participation in the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families program requires compliance with both the guidelines in Title IV-D of the Social
Security Act and any accompanying federal regulations, including mandates on paternity
establishment. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
64
42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2006).
65
See Jeffrey Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards: More and
Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53 (2010).
66
DIV. VITAL RECORDS, SOUTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF HEALTH AND ENVTL. CONTROL,
PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGMENT (containing a section entitled, “To Be Completed When
Father Acknowledges Paternity Prior to the Birth of the Child”) (on file with authors). See
also D.C. Code § 16-909.03(b)(1)(G) (“Each public and private birthing hospital in the
District of Columbia shall operate a program that, immediately before and after the birth of
a child, provides to each unmarried woman who gives birth at the hospital and the alleged
putative father, if present in the hospital: The opportunity to acknowledge paternity
voluntarily in the hospital.”).
67
VITAL STAT. UNIT, TEXAS DEP’T STATE HEALTH SERVS., FORM NO. VS-159.1M,
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY (rev. Sept. 2005) (allowing paternity acknowledgment
up to 300 days prior to birth) (on file with authors).
68
HEALTH STAT. & VITAL RECORDS, COLORADO DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T,
VOLUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY (rev. 2003) (form “may not be completed
before the birth of the child”), available at http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/certs/
paternity_acknowl.pdf.
69
OFFICE OF TEMP. AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF
HEALTH FORM NO. LDSS-4418, ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PATERNITY (rev. Aug. 1998)
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bar them. Such prohibitions serve no significant purpose and deter many paternity
acknowledgments without good reason. Men who acknowledge paternity are no
more certain of their genetic ties shortly after birth than they are shortly before
birth. Pre-birth acknowledgments are less costly and more convenient than postbirth paternity cases. 70 They prompt male obligations benefitting both mothers and
their children.
State interests in pre-birth paternity acknowledgment should, however, give
way to the constitutional privacy rights of expectant mothers early in pregnancy. 71
But with third-trimester acknowledgments, there are generally no constitutional
abortion rights. 72 The facilitation of third-trimester paternity acknowledgments
would lead to more parental and quasi-parental relationships benefitting both
women and their future and actual offspring.
V. “UNITARY FAMILY” OBLIGATIONS
Generally, an unwed biological father has been recognized as having a
constitutionally-protected interest in establishing a relationship with his child. 73
However, if a child is the product of adultery, states can give categorical
preference to the mother’s husband even though doing so forecloses the paternal
interests of the genetic father.74 In Michael H. v. Gerald D., Gerald’s wife had an
adulterous affair and gave birth to a child who was the biological daughter of
Michael H. 75 Michael sought to establish paternity and visitation rights through a
California filiation action. 76 Michael was denied standing under a California statute
that stated “the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or

(explaining, “You may only sign an Acknowledgment of paternity after the birth of the
child”) (emphasis in original) (on file with authors).
70
Some men, like soldiers, simply cannot be present at the births of their children,
though they may be available to acknowledge beforehand.
71
See Jeffrey A. Parness, Abortions of the Parental Prerogatives of Unwed Natural
Fathers: Deterring Lost Paternity, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 347, 347 (2000) (citing R.R. v. M.H.,
689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998)).
72
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973) (“If the State is interested in
protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that
period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”).
73
See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (finding in an adoption setting:
“The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he
grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future,
he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable
contributions to the child’s development”).
74
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (holding that an extant
marital relationship can trump an established relationship between a father and biological
child).
75
Id. at 113.
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Id. at 115.

2012]

THE PRICE OF PLEASURE

255

sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.” 77 Michael argued
that the statute violated his federal constitutional rights. 78 In a plurality opinion, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a state may create a presumption of paternity in a
husband that is not subject to rebuttal by a biological father in order to promote
family integrity and preserve the family unit.79 The Court further explained that
precedent regarding fathers’ rights “rest . . . upon the historic respect—indeed,
sanctity would not be too strong a term—traditionally accorded to the relationships
that develop within the unitary family.” 80 Today, what might constitute a “unitary
family” beyond a marital family is unclear. 81 Even within marriage the concept is
unclear, as marriages may not, as in the case of Michael H., exist for the whole
period of time between conception and birth.82
What is clear is that the U.S. Constitution did not protect Michael’s right to
disturb the marital family. 83 The dissent, however, recognized Michael’s federal
constitutional interest in visitation with his child, 84 which we believe means there
would be a need for a hearing on whether visitation should be ordered. The
dissenting justices rejected the “unitary family” approach, criticizing the plurality
for pretending that “tradition places a discernable border around the
Constitution.” 85
77

Id. at 115–17 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a)). Under earlier California law,
however, a wife or husband could seek to rebut the presumption with “blood tests, but only
if a motion for such tests is made, within two years from the date of the child’s birth,”
where the wife alone can seek rebuttal “if the natural father has filed an affidavit
acknowledging paternity.” Id. The statute has since been amended, rendering the martial
presumption of paternity more rebuttable. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(a) (West 2010)
(“Notwithstanding Section 7540 [defining martial presumption], if the court finds the
husband is not the father of the child, the question of paternity of the husband shall be
resolved accordingly.”).
78
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115–16.
79
Id. at 120 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, & Kennedy, J.J., with
Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he conclusive presumption not only expresses
the state’s substantive policy but also furthers it, excluding inquiries into the child’s
paternity that would be destructive of family integrity and privacy.”).
80
Id. at 123 n.3.
81
See Anthony Miller, The Case for the Genetic Parent: Stanley, Quilloin, Caban,
Lehr, & Michael H. Revisited, 53 LOY. L. REV. 395, 439−40 (2007) (“Justice Scalia’s
‘unitary family’ test does not resolve the issue of who falls within the definition of such a
family.”).
82
See, e.g., State v. EKB, 35 P.3d 1224 (Wy. 2001); State ex rel. Clanton v. Clanton,
1996 WL 456037 (Neb. App. 1996). In Michael H., Justice Scalia described the “unitary
family” as the “family unit accorded traditional respect in our society.” 491 U.S. at 124 n.3.
But see Miller, supra note 83.
83
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129 (where a “natural father’s unique opportunity conflicts
with the similarly unique opportunity of the husband of marriage . . . it is not
unconstitutional for the State to give categorical preference to the latter”).
84
Id. at 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85
Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens offered a distinct perspective, casting a critical vote in
Michael H. Justice Stevens agreed with the dissent, stating “that a natural father
might even have a constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with a child
whose mother was married to and cohabitating with another man at the time of the
child’s conception.” 86 However, he concurred in the judgment because California
law accorded Michael a “fair opportunity” to show that his child’s “interests would
be served by granting him visitation rights.” 87
In Preglimony, Motro opines that a pregnancy-support scheme should utilize a
functional approach and not an approach based solely on marital or genetic ties. 88
The justices in Michael H. recognized that the United States Constitution
sometimes permits states to impose a duty on husbands to support children born to
their respective wives regardless of biological ties.89 The significance of biological
ties sometimes carries less weight than the interest in preserving a family. State
interests in preserving the family in Michael H. trumped Michael’s constitutional
opportunity interest in paternity, which the Fourteenth Amendment affords to
many other unwed biological fathers. 90
At least some justices in Michael H. reasoned that states may also impose
obligations on unwed men who have special relationships with women who bear
their children. According to these justices, the State has a sufficient interest in
preserving a unitary family, typified not only by the marital family but also by a
“household of unmarried parents and their children.” 91 States respect familial
86

Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 135 (Stevens, J., concurring). Four other justices held that Michael’s consent
was unnecessary to the child’s adoption notwithstanding the biological ties. Id. at 143.
88
Preglimony, supra note 1, at 694 (“Another reason for not requiring that the payor
prove a genetic connection to the pregnancy is equitable.”). Motro draws from Michael H.
to illustrate that “family law trends diminish the focus on blood ties for purposes of
determining paternity in favor of more functional approaches.” Id.
89
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 120, 120, 124 (in upholding the constitutionality of
California’s irrebutable presumption of paternity statute, the plurality explained that the
conclusive presumption is a “fundamental principle of the common law” and reasoned that
“the conclusive presumption not only expresses the State’s substantive policy but also
furthers it, excluding inquiries into the child’s paternity that would be destructive of family
integrity and privacy.”); see also id. at 132−33 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“the Federal
Constitution imposes no obligation upon a State to ‘declare facts unless some legal
consequence hinges upon the requested declaration.’”); but see id. at 158–60 (Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (basing the unconstitutionality of the California
irrebutable presumption statute on the Due Process rights of the natural father).
90
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263 (1983) (adoption setting).
91
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor,
Kennedy, J.J., with Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Perhaps the concept [of the
unitary family] can be expanded even beyond this, but it will bear no resemblance to
traditionally respected relationships”). Compare id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“marriage is not decisive in answering the question of whether the Constitution protects
the parental relationship under consideration” so that parental protections are afforded
individual and not familial units).
87
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integrity when they impose obligations upon men (or women) married to women
who bear children. Likewise, respect for family integrity would be served by
imposing obligations on men and women in quasi-marital relationships with
women who bear their children, with such obligations beginning prior to birth.
State recognition for certain non-marital family units would benefit many women
as well as their future and actual offspring.
Would unwed sexual partnerships where pregnancies occur prompt “unitary
family” status, thus triggering obligations to future offspring as well as between
partners? Should such a status ever be afforded a non-marital opposite sex
partnership where the male partner lacks genetic ties?
These hard questions we leave to others who we hope will join us and
Professor Motro in conversation. We support statutory “unitary family” status for
some unwed or un-unionized same sex female couples who intend to parent within
a single home a child born of sex92 or of artificial reproduction to one of the
partners, assuming there are no Lehr paternity interests in the sperm provider. 93
VI. CONCLUSION
In her two recent articles on pregnancy-support, Shari Motro argues that
American laws should no longer treat “lovers as strangers” and urges that the
relationship between an unwed heterosexual couple whose sexual encounter leads
to pregnancy “demands its own legal category.” 94 Motro suggests a new paradigm
that generally holds men responsible to women for the burdens of pregnancy,
employing both contract and tort principles.
Any conversation about the price of sex to men who cause children to be born
must include obligations to the children as well as to their mothers. Mothers and
children are inextricably linked, as are the Lehr paternity opportunity interests of
genetic fathers. We urge conversations about expanded obligations of prospective
fathers that include new pre-birth monetary support obligations; enhanced
opportunities for pre-birth voluntary paternity acknowledgments; and greater
protections of “unitary” families into which children are born, which should
include couples whose sex could never prompt a pregnancy. Let us heed Professor
Motro’s call for conversation but let us talk about all who are interested in the
price of pleasure.
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See Jeffrey A. Parness, Reforming American Paternity Procedures, in MARK A.
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., GENETIC TIES AND FAMILY 153–54 (2005).
93
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Civil Unions and Parenthood at Birth, 99 ILL. B.J. 473
(Sept. 2011), available at SSRN abstract = 1885780.
94
Preglimony, supra note 1, at 667.

